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Abstract
In a many-worlds framework, combining decoherent histories and
extreme-value statistics, it is conjectured that the (matrix) dimension
of the Hamiltonian processing records and memories near the end of
an observer’s history is almost entirely located in a single branch of
his/her wavefunction.
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1 Introduction
The theory of decoherence has been successful in explaining many of the
classical features of an observer’s world [1, 2]. Among the problems left un-
explained is that of outcomes of a quantum measurement, which is because
decoherence does not require any collapse of a wave function1, but is con-
sistent with a many-worlds interpretation. The latter [4] is usually taken to
imply that an observer’s impression of living in a unique world does not reflect
his/her true wave function, but rather reflects the mutual unobservability of
decoherent branches, supposed to be equivalent.
The splitting into branches is a consequence of the Schro¨dinger equation
applied to an act of observation, hence can be seen as a matter of first prin-
ciples. But there is no such basis for assuming the equivalence of branches.
These may carry different weights in a subjective sense. “Massive redun-
dancy can cause certain information to become objective, at the expense of
other information” as pointed out in [5]. However, while [5] proceeds by
measuring redundance in information-theoretic terms, the notion of weight
1Using statistical operators in the context of decoherence is a matter of convenience;
for an approach using state vectors only, cf. [3].
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advocated here is rather that of [6], where decoherent histories of observations
are defined by sequences of projection operators, and the weight assigned to
a history is the dimension of the projected subspace. In the present paper,
weight will be assigned in proportion to the dimension of the observer’s “ex-
periential subspace”, determined by an effective Hamiltonian of interacting
memories and records at the end of a branch of history. The reason for
assuming such a fundamental role of backward causation lies in order statis-
tics [7, 8] of power-law ensembles, which comes into play here because the
number of records and memories is conjectured to be pseudo-random and
power-law distributed. Since the number of branches is largest towards their
ends, the extremal draw, which turns out to be exhaustive, is most likely to
occur there.
The exact form of statistical ensemble conjectured is exponentials of
power-law variates. While power laws are ubiquitous empirically, with many
scenarios for their generation conceivable [9, 10], exponentiation needs to
be motivated. It is based on the observation [5] that records of quantum-
mechanical measurements are, in normal circumstances, stored in subsystems
provided as fragments of the environment,
E = EA ⊗ EB ⊗ EC ⊗ · · ·
For an observer to become aware of a record, he/she must physically interact
with it. This requires (as in all models considered in [5]) minimal dimensions
DEA ≥ 2 DEB ≥ 2 DEC ≥ 2 · · ·
If it is assumed that the records fluctuate in number, with power-law distri-
bution over the branches, it follows that the product of their dimensions is
an exponentiated power-law variate.
In this case, by a theorem of order statistics [7, 8], the largest draw
of the number of records exceeds the second-largest draw by a difference
increasing with the size N of the ensemble (number of branches) like some
positive power N1/α. The exponentiated number (dimension) in the extremal
branch, consequently, exhausts nearly all of the dimension summed over the
branches.
In section 2, some extreme-value statistics is recalled. Section 3 points
out the role of effective Hamiltonians for the scenario envisioned. Section
4 elaborates on the exponentiation of power-law variates. Because of the
branching structure, some care is needed to ensure statistically independent
draws from a power-law ensemble, which is discussed in section 5. The some-
what problematic role of amplitudes in the scenario is discussed in section 6.
Conclusions are given in section 7. Conjectures 1, 2, 3 give the main ideas.
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2 Recalling some extreme-value statistics
Order statistics [7, 8] provides the following theorem on outliers of power-
law distributions. In an ensemble of size N of random variables X with a
probability density proportional to X−1−α for large X, the difference of the
largest and second-largest draw is (notation of [8] corollary 4.2.13)
X1,N −X2,N = N1/α Y Y = random variable independent of N (1)
The power law need not be exact, but the distribution must lie in the domain
of attraction of the Fre´chet distribution, which has a cumulative distribution
function exp(−X−α). The point is that the difference in (1) becomes arbi-
trarily large with N → ∞. By contrast, it would remain finite for normally
and even log-normally distributed variables.
In the present context, N is the number of observer’s branches, assumed
to grow exponentially on average. Thus, if the observer’s lifetime is T ,
N ∝ eT/∆ (2)
Equation (1) with N → ∞ need not amount to any domination of the ex-
treme for power-law ensembles themselves, since the second largest value
would also be of order N1/α. However, if the variable is exponentiated like
2X , the extremal draw easily exceeds the summed-up variables of the rest of
draws, since 2N
1/α  N .
It should be noted that, when extremal values are taken over increasingly
large ensembles, not every distribution lies in the domain of attraction of
one the three possible limiting forms. Exponentiated power-law variates,
with cumulative distribution function of the form F (Z) = exp(−β(lnZ)−α),
do not satisfy the convergence criterion (as given in corollary 3.3.8 of [8]).
The reason for proposing the fundamental role of backward causation in
the scenario is that “when the sum of [. . . ] independent heavy-tail random
variables is large, then it is very likely that only one summand is large” [11].
Because of this, there is no advantage in alternative scenarios in which the
extremal quantity is accumulated during an observer’s lifetime. The extremal
draw most probably occurs near the end of a branch, since the ensemble
is largest there. Using (2) and estimating probabilities as proportional to
instantaneous ensemble sizes, p = e−n for an occurrence earlier than T −n∆.
A “final draw” mechanism for gathering the bits of experience (assuming
power-law distribution) can be quite efficient. If bits were accumulated at
a constant rate, their number would grow proportional to the observer’s
lifetime T . On the other hand, if the bits are assembled by supercritical,
randomly terminated chain reaction substisting on a reservoir of uncollapsed
3
superpositions towards the ends of an observer’s branches, their number rises
proportional to N1/α [9, 10] where N is given by (2). Thus, the number of
bits grows exponentially with T .
3 Random effective Hamiltonians
In applications of quantum mechanics, one identifies an effective Hamiltonian
relating to the coordinates of interest. In the scenario considered here, each
branching of the system-observer state is assumed to be accompanied by the
emergence of a new effective Hamiltonian for each branch. All those Hamil-
tonians would, in principle, be determined by a large number of conditions
contained in the exact initial state of the observer and his/her environment.
For all practical purposes, the following should hold.
Conjecture 1 Initial conditions for an observer and his/her environment
are sufficiently complex, such that effective Hamiltonians, governing branches
of the wavefunction, are pseudo-random.
The randomness is assumed to apply to an observer’s processing of experi-
ences as well. No collapse of a wavefunction is involved here.
Von Neumann’s scheme [12] for a measurement described by a Schro¨dinger
equation requires only slight augmentation. The joint evolution of system
and recording device proceeds, accordingly, like
|ψ〉|blank〉 −→
n∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|ψ〉 |recorded i〉 (3)
For simplicity, it is often assumed that the recorded states are uniquely spec-
ified by the label given. This is what has to be changed for the present
approach. As discussed in section 4, a readable record must lie in a subspace
of two, or more, dynamically accessible dimensions. Von Neumann’s scheme
should therefore be augmented by postulating
|recorded i〉 ∈ Hrecorded i dimHrecorded i ≥ 2 (4)
4 Exponentiating power-law variates
Rephrasing what has been stressed in [5] already, any bit of information that
“exists” for a mind must participate in the process of cognition. For this,
the bit must be physically represented by a subsystem ready to reveal its
existence by interaction, which requires dimension ≥ 2. For example, if some
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information would be stored in a particular neuron of the observer, it would
have the dimensions of firing and resting, corresponding to the open and
closed state of an ion-pore molecule. Since this is the basis of neural activity,
and since dimension is not lost when systems are coupled for collective ac-
tion (the dimension being preserved in the number of different patterns that
could be supported) it would seem justified to assume a dimension of 2X
for the cognitive subspace in which X neurons are involved. Similarly, the
information stored in a black grain of a photograph is available by absorption
of light, which at least requires two energy levels. In von Neumann’s mini-
mal scheme, where there is branching from a blank state to one-dimensional
recorded states, acquisition of higher-dimensional systems is only postponed
until the reading of the records. The presence of |recorded i〉 may be de-
tected, for example, by some scattering experiment, which would require ≥ 2
outgoing channels.
Conjecture 2 The number of interacting records, each carrying dimension
two at least, is power-law distributed over the ends of an observer’s branches.
On this basis, we can estimate the exhaustiveness of the extremal branch.
Let X be the random number of bits, and 2X the dimension of the observer’s
experiential subspace. If the observer ends up with N branches, we can use
(1) to estimate the fraction of dimension outside the leading branch to be
smaller than
(N − 1)× 2X2,N
/
2X1,N = 2−Z where Z = N1/α +O(logN) (5)
since in every non-leading branch the number of bits is not greater than X2,N .
But is dimension an “element of reality”, or rather a formal construct,
invoked only in order to enhance an otherwise insufficient effect? In appli-
cations of Fermi’s Golden Rule, transition probabilities are proportional to
the density of final states, thus indeed, proportional to the dimensions of
subspaces. On the other hand, if subspaces emerge as products of qubits,
it would be information-theoretic practice to count the bits, not the dimen-
sion. For large ensembles, obviously, this makes a crucial difference in the
statistical properties.
5 Final draw of Hamiltonian
Formula (1) applies to independent random draws with a power-law distri-
bution of probabilities. It is not sufficient to have an ensemble in which a
quantity k occurs in a number k−µ of members. For example, in randomly
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growing scale-free networks [13], a probability P (k) ∝ k−1−α develops for
a node to have k connections, if preferential attachment of new nodes to
existing ones is assumed. But if the maximal node size has grown to kmax,
the second-largest size is typically kmax − 1; there is no outlier emerging2.
Thus, it would be an insufficient scenario to regard an observer’s branching
tree as a network, and the mere termination of a branch as random draw,
since the ends of branches are highly correlated by the common parts of their
history. A similar problem occurs with power-law ensembles generated by
Galton-Watson processes, like critical processes generating P (k) ∝ k−3/2 for
the number of bits summed over all generations [14].
Statistically, some “final draw” near the end of each branch is required.
Observer’s awareness here enters the scenario, since in addition to a reservoir
of records, awareness requires cognitive dynamics, supposedly (Conjecture 1)
represented by some pseudo-random effective Hamiltonian. Matrix elements
Hij would provide the links between clusters of records (including memories
as neuronal records). Some kind of chain reaction could be envisioned, which
would be the standard scenario for generating power-laws [9, 10]. It would
have to be supercritical (exponential growth) and terminate with a constant
incident rate (exponential distribution of runtime). If the number of gen-
erated bits grows like eβt, and if the probability for runtimes decreases like
e−γt, the probability for generating k bits in the process is P (k) ∝ k−1−γ/β.
It should be stressed, however, that Heff is supposed to result from the chain
reaction, not to generate it. The generation would be accomplished, as sug-
gested by Conjecture 1, by an all-encompassing Hamiltonian3. Conjecture 2
with estimate (5) then suggests
Conjecture 3 Observer’s one-world experience resides in (the matrix di-
mension of) the effective Hamiltonian processing records and memories near
the end of his/her extremal branch.
2In a classical network with preferential attachment superproportional to k, the “winner
takes all” [13]. However, in the application here, the winning cluster would grow during a
large number of branchings, so most of it would be common to many branches.
3Speculating in more detail, a “final draw” could work as follows. Firstly, assume a
hierarchy in the observer’s experiences, with physiological events at the top (determining
ends of branches, guaranteeing for decoherence and statistical independence), followed by
redundant observations of various degrees. Secondly, allow for a redundant observation
to be preserved in a state of superposition (uncollapsed) until, by one of the final Hamil-
tonians, one of its components becomes linked to the more basic experiences and their
dynamical dimensions. That component, being part of a system-observer entanglement,
will carry indications of the time at which the observation was originally made. It will
thus fit in with the observer’s subjective account of history.
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6 Problematic role of amplitudes
A tacit assumption has been that the number of branches emerging in an
observation are finite, and their probability amplitudes more or less equal.
It should be noted that Born’s rule can be derived on such a basis [15]. On
the other hand, a finite number of branches is an idealisation in which any
remote possibilities, such as tunneling under a macroscopic potential barrier,
are neglected. Clearly, such amplitudes are extremely small, and in fact,
their numerics is even more extreme than that of dimensional statistics. For
example, if an observer can cope with 300 measurements per second, the
amplitude in his/her extremal branch after 100 years of lifetime would be
2−10
12
while a tunnel amplitude with objects in the range of SI units4 would be
e−10
34
So there is some tolerance for neglecting the remote possibilities. Smallness,
in itself, need not be a problem, since awareness requires interaction (as as-
sumed throughout the paper) and there is no handle for an interaction with
the amplitude in strictly linear dynamics. However, what the scenario sug-
gests is that 2−10
12
is big enough for an observer to be aware of, while e−10
34
is not. Discretisation of amplitudes could be a solution, but it would have
to occur on a scale vastly different from what is found (10−20) by consid-
ering fundamental limits on the amount of information needed to measure
amplitudes by using interference patterns [16, 17].
The role assumed for an observer’s consciousness allows to avoid a con-
ceptional dilemma. If it were the number of all physical branchings that
would distinguish the extremal branch, observer’s awareness would reside
in precisely those parts of his/her wavefunction whose amplitudes are the
smallest among alternatives. However, the extremal branch is only distin-
guished by the number of subsystems activated for cognitive processing. This
would seem to be compatible with an equal number of physical (and mostly
unperceived) branchings, more or less, in each of an observer’s histories.
4The extreme numerics of macroscopic tunnel amplitudes motivated this author’s pre-
vious approach to objectification [18] in which tunnel amplitudes where considered as the
fluctuating quantity. However, while a particular summand in a superposition of object-
observer states might well be strongly enhanced this way, alternative branches are still
there, and with a chance of about 50%, the next measurement will enhance a previously
suppressed branch by an even larger factor. A series of determined outcomes can only
emerge if an observer’s histories are finite, and if one of them is selected as an entity.
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7 Conclusion
Assuming an observer’s wavefunction to be branching, by unitary evolution,
into a large number of decoherent parts, and assuming each bit of observer’s
experience to be physically represented by a subsystem, it is conjectured that
the number of subsystems cognitively processed near the ends of branches be
stochastically independent and power-law distributed. Order statistics then
implies that one of the branches carries almost all of the dimension contained
in the ensemble of those subsystems. This would render physical substance
to an observer’s impression of living in a unique world.
The storing of records in interactive subsystems ensures objectivity to
the extent that an observer is able to verify it. On his/her extremal branch,
he/she will find other observers interacting with the same subsystem, so they
will agree on what has been recorded.
As to whether quantum physics is determinate or indeterminate, the sce-
nario suggests a complex answer. The law governing all time evolution is a
Schro¨dinger equation, deterministic in terms of an all-encompassing wave-
function. What is perceived to happen at a particular moment in an ob-
server’s lifetime, however, is determined by an effective “final” Hamiltonian,
leaving only probabilistic ways of predicting anything at intermediate times.
In principle, the effective “final” Hamiltonian should be determined by the
all-encompassing wavefunction at any time, in conjunction with a universal
exact Hamiltonian.
The scenario suggests a fundamental role of backward causation in quan-
tum-mechanical objectification. How plausible is it that conscious perception
of the present should not only depend on existing memories, as in the bio-
logical theory of [19], but on the processing of memories in the future? The
Heisenberg picture may provide a clue. State vectors in this picture are
“timeless”, but time reappears in “labels” of basis states. The state |ψ〉 of
an observer’s lifetime, including all of his/her experiences, can be expressed
in many different bases, like |ψ〉 = ∑l1 ψl1,t1 |l1, t1〉 = ∑l2 ψl2,t2 |l2, t2〉 etc.
The number of basis states needed to represent |ψ〉 is exhaustively given by
the dimension of the extremal branch. But at intermediate times, the ob-
server’s state is the same, only expressed in different bases. The question is
thus shifted from causal relations to what makes up the time label of basis
states.
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